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China's Economic and Political Clout




For many years during the Cold War, the Third World was
a battleground for two superpowers-the United States and the
former Soviet Union. These two nations fought to exert their in-
fluence throughout Latin America in order to gain political, eco-
nomic, and military clout. When the Soviet Union fell, the
United States lost interest in its relationship with Latin Ameri-
can countries. During the past five years, China has stepped
into the void left by these two retreating superpowers.1 As
China increases and solidifies economic ties to the region and
secures oil, minerals, and other commodities from this region, it
gains economic and political influence at the expense of U.S. in-
terests. If Chinese economic power surpasses that of the United
States, Latin American countries may no longer feel the need to
cooperate with U.S. initiatives in trade, human rights, antinar-
cotics, environmental safeguards, and U.S. national security. In
* The author, a Nicaraguan immigrant, is a 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of
Minnesota Law School; M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A., 1994, Virginia Tech.
He counseled Latin American security personnel in military bases, police depart-
ments, the Panama Canal, and infrastructure consturction projects. He thanks his
wife, Katherine, the source of all his inspiration.
1. See generally Mary Anastasia O'Grady, The Middle Kingdom in Latin
America, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2004, at All (noting that leaders of some Latin
American countries see China as an alternative to dealing with the United States
and that anti-American sentiment is rising). In referring to China's investments in
Latin America, the Institute of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the Univer-
sity of Miami quoted Dr. Cynthia Watson: "They are interested in oil contracts in
Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia.... Mhey want to show Latin American nations
that they will treat them as sovereigns, that they won't preach to them and they will
act as partners." Id. Dr. Watson is a professor of strategy at the National War Col-
lege in Washington. Id.
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China, Latin America is likely to find an attractive alternative
to economic trade that is not contingent upon U.S. interests.
The Monroe Doctrine proclaimed that the Western Hemi-
sphere is "America's backyard."2  The United States helped
Latin American countries gain their independence from Spain
and later in the twentieth century, assisted them in the process
of democratization. 3 Stable democracies in Latin America re-
duce regional crises and increase cooperation. Today, the
United States needs a stable Latin America in order to assure
itself an important source of regional oil.4
This Note seeks to highlight a potential threat to the eco-
nomic, political, and military interests of the United States in
Latin America as China's economic influence grows. Part I dis-
cusses current U.S. and Chinese trade relations with Latin
American countries. Part II analyzes the potential conse-
quences of China's increasing economic activity in Latin Amer-
ica, why the United States must counter it, and how it must do
so. Part II also analyzes U.S. insistence of dealing with the is-
sue of agricultural subsidies only through the legal framework
of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture and
its effect on the future of the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas. This Note concludes that if the United States does
not counter China's aggressive economic involvement in Latin
America, the United States will lose clout in the event of a con-
frontation with China. Instead of the current approach, the
United States should pursue bilateral agreements and, together
with each Latin American country, put in place social policies
that will enable Latin Americans to adjust to free trade.
I. UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND LATIN AMERICA
A. UNITED STATES TRADE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA
1. Historical Trade Figures and New Trade Initiatives
Annual trade between the United States and Latin America
2. Richard E. Friedman, Letter from the Publisher, NAT'L STRATEGY F. REV.,
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(including the Caribbean) is approximately $360 billion.5 This
is almost as much as the United States trades with the entire
European Community.6 "By the year 2010, U.S. trade with
Latin America is expected to exceed that with the European
Economic Community and Japan combined." 7  Currently, the
United States has various trade agreements with Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries.
The United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),8 which came into
force in the United States on January 1, 1994.9 It eliminated
tariffs between these three countries on most of the products
they manufacture. 10 In its effort to promote a good working re-
lation within the NAFTA framework, the United States estab-
lished consultative committees through which trade differences
could be addressed." The only other Western Hemisphere free
trade agreement to which the United States is a party is the
Chile Free Trade Agreement (Chile FTA).12 Chile and the
United States have eliminated tariffs on eighty-five percent of
trade and will phase out remaining tariffs by 2007.13 One rea-
son that the United States entered into this free trade agree-
ment with Chile was to reward Chile for its low level of corrup-
5. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
2004: Hearings Before the Comm. on Armed Services United States Senate, 108th
Cong. 535 (2003) (statement of Gen. James T. Hills), available at http://armed-




8. For text, see North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 605.
9. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 101, 19
U.S.C. § 3301 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act]; Exec. Order No.
12,889, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,681 (Dec. 27, 1993).
10. See NAFTA Implementation Act § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 3301 (1993).
11. U.S.-Latin American Trade Policy Initiatives Beyond NAFTA,
AGEXPORTER, May 2003, at 7, available at http:lwww.fas.usda.gov/infolagexporterl
2003JMay/pgpercent207.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Trade Policy Ini-
tiatives].
12. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United
States and Chile Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement (June 6, 2003), available at
http://www/ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary[PressReleases/2003/June/UnitedStatesC
hileSignHistoricFreeTradeAgreement.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2005) [herein-
after Chile FTA]. See generally Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7; OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF THE U.S.-
CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 3 (2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeAgreements/BilateralChileFTAassetupload file411_5109.pdf (last visited
Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW].
13. Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
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tion.14 As of October 2004, Congress has passed no implement-
ing act.
The United States is pursuing the Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with five Central American nations:
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicara-
gua.15 Although negotiations were scheduled to be completed by
December 2003, as of October 2004 no agreement had been
reached. 16 The United States Senate is to debate the issue in
2005.17
The United States Congress passed the Caribbean Trade
Partnership Act in 2002.18 The Act expanded the Caribbean Ba-
sin Economic Recovery Act,19 which provides preferential treat-
ment for the importation of certain products from Caribbean
countries. 20
In 2002, the United States enacted the Andean Trade Pro-
motion and Drug Eradication Act. 21 The Act was an expansion
of the Andean Trade Preference Act, 22 which was first passed in
1991.23 It gave the President the power to grant duty-free
treatment for eligible articles. 24 The Act granted additional
14. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 535-42.
15. See Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that CAFTA will
comprise thirty-five million consumers among five countries).
16. See id.
17. Friedman, supra note 2, at 5.
18. Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
19. For the Executive Summary, see THOMAS F. JENNINGS ET AL., U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT: IMPACT ON U.S.
INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS, at v (1994), available at http:/lhotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/
pubs/332/pub2927/pub2927.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). For the 2003 report as-
sessing the effects of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act on the U.S. econ-
omy, on U.S. industries, and on U.S. consumers, see WALKER A. POLLAR ET AL., U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY
ACT 1-1 (2003), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3636/
pub3636.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
20. See 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (listing the twenty-seven beneficiary countries);
Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
21. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-210, 116 Stat. 1023 (2002). For background information, see Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, H.R. 3009-Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ombflegislative/sap/1O7-1[HR3009-
h.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005); Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
22. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (1991). For background information, see U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, Andean Trade Preference Act, at http://www/mac.doc.gov/
atpa/webmain/intro-revise.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
23. Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
24. 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (1991) ('The President may proclaim duty-free treatment
for all eligible articles from any beneficiary country in accordance with the provi-
sions of this chapter.").
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trade benefits 25 and increased the list of duty-free items to
6,300.26 Although this and other trade acts have improved eco-
nomic relations between the United States and its neighbors to
the south, the United States has more ambitious goals.
The United States aims to set up a free trade zone in this
hemisphere.27 The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)28
would include thirty-four of the hemisphere's thirty-five nations
(excluding Cuba). 29 The FTAA would thus bring 800 million
people into a single market.30 However, several sources of fric-
tion, especially ongoing disputes between the United States and
some Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, will make it
unlikely that an agreement will be reached any time soon. 31
2. Sources of Friction
Many Latin American governments and their citizens do
not support the FTAA.32 Presidents Nestor Kirchner of Argen-
25. See id. § 3203.
26. See id; Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
27. See Mario E. Carranza, Mercosur, The Free Trade Area of the Americas, and
the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1030-
31 (2004) (noting that the FTAA negotiations were launched in April 1998 and were
supposed to be concluded by January 2005). The FTAA would annex the Latin
American economies to the U.S. economy and this would eliminate all barriers to
U.S. investment in the region, which includes national restrictions on government
procurement. Id. at 1032. It would also allow U.S. firms "to sue the Latin American
governments over health, labor, and environmental laws." Id. See generally Rafael
Lorente, Trade Key to Latin America Strategy but Some Fear Bush's Approach is Too
Narrow, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 2003, at 1A, 2003 WL 65981736 (discussing
that the United States seeks to have a hemispheric free trade agreement and that it
uses trade agreements to promote democracy).
28. For background information, see Free Trade of the Americas, at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMMltci/tnmin22_e.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2005);
Carranza, supra note 27, at 1030 (noting that the FTAA negotiations were launched
on April 18-19, 1998).
29. Lorente, supra note 27, at IA.
30. See Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that the U.S. pro-
posal providing that fifty-six percent of agricultural imports from countries in this
800 million-people region will be duty-free as soon as the FVAA takes effect and that
other agricultural tariffs "will fall into staging categories of five years, [ten] years, or
longer"). Nations should get different rates of reductions depending on their eco-
nomic size and level of development. Id.
31. Lorente, supra note 27, at IA (asserting that disputes between Brazil and
other nations in the region are making it less likely that the FTAA will be completed
by 2005).
32. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1033-34 & n.12 (noting that seventy-six
percent of those polled in Brazil, the largest economy in South America, believed
that free trade in this hemisphere would benefit the United States primarily); Op-
penheimer, infra note 43 (discussing the poll conducted by Zogby International and
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tina and Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva of Brazil have publicly criti-
cized it.33 Mr. Enrique Espinosa, a former trade negotiator for
Mexico, said "It would be very bad to rush the negotiation in or-
der to meet the deadline."34 President da Silva recently traveled
to China as part of a mission to rearrange global trade.35 By ne-
gotiating trade deals with China, Brazil and Argentina are at-
tempting to challenge U.S. domination in free-trade talks in the
Western Hemisphere. 36 The major sources of friction include
the perception of hypocrisy on the part of the United States on
free trade and the perception of lopsided benefits given to the
United States from the FTAA.37 Many Latin Americans, cor-
rectly or not, think that the United States treats their countries
as inferior nations that are expected to support U.S. interests,
rather than as equal trading partners.38 Another source of fric-
the University of Miami). Thirty-nine percent of those polled said that the FTAA
would benefit both Latin America and the United States. Carranza, supra note 27,
at 1033-34 & n.12. The United States wants to gain access to the MERCOSUR-the
southern trade bloc comprising Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay-before
this bloc establishes a free trade deal with the European Union. See id. at 1031,
1034; Carlos A. Ball, U.S. Policy Has Gone South, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at B13
(noting that Latin Americans oppose the FTAA for various reasons including the fact
that the United States insists on free trade but gives its farmers generous subsi-
dies). The United States imposes strict labor and environment standards that may
remove competitive advantages that smaller countries may have over the United
States. Id.
33. Geri Smith, The Latin Chill May Get Even Frostier, BUS. WK., Jan. 26,
2004, at 63.
34. Talking Trade, LATIN TRADE, Sept. 2004, at 19; see also Makram Haluani,
Benign Neglect, HARV. INT'L REV., Winter 2003, at 50 (discussing that Latin Ameri-
can nations are hesitant about moving too quickly and opening their markets).
Rushing to set up the FTAA may result in negative economic consequences in Latin
American countries. See id. at 52. Many have refused to open their government
procurement bidding processes to foreign companies. Id.
35. See Brazil: China Appeal, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT-Bus. LATIN AM.,
May 17, 2004, at 2, 2004 WL 63625721 (noting that Brazil sees a tremendous eco-
nomic opportunity in China).
36. Id.
37. See Ball, supra note 32, at B13.
38. See Brian Selmeski, Latin America: Latin America 101, NAT'L STRATEGY F.
REV., Fall 2004, at 6, available at http://www.nationalstrategy.com/Fall%202004.pdf
(last visited Jan. 21, 2005) (arguing that the United States should not ignore, con-
fuse, or bully Latin Americans). The United States should view Latin America as an
opportunity and learn about the region's culture and intimate issues. Id. at 12. It
should take elected officials and their national priorities seriously as well as their
limitations. Id. It should recognize that free trade is not desirable nor is it possible
at this time. Id. The United States should promote freer trade with greater sensi-
tivity and safeguards for these countries instead of pressuring Latin American poli-
ticians. Id. Finally, it should support the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs)
established by the United Nations to address poverty, education, healthcare, HIV
prevention, and the environment. Id.
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tion is that many Latin Americans have not seen the promised
benefits of capitalism and have grown skeptical of democracy in
general. 39
The perceived U.S. hypocrisy was at its highest level in
March 2002, when President Bush imposed tariffs on steel from
Brazil and Venezuela 40 and announced a $130 billion subsidy
package for U.S. farmers. 41 The Bush Administration also im-
posed a sixty percent surcharge on orange-juice concentrate
from Brazil, protecting 90,000 orange-growing farmers in Flor-
ida.42 Brazil and Argentina are demanding that the United
States cut its agricultural subsidies, but the United States in-
sists that it will address the issue of agricultural subsidies only
at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which offers a flexible
legal framework within which the United States can continue
its agricultural subsidies.43 These protectionist measures add to
Latin Americans' perception of the United States being not fully
committed to free trade in the Americas. 44
China, on the other hand, has lowered its own tariffs from
forty-one percent in 1992 to six percent after joining the WTO in
December of 2001. 45 It has the lowest tariff protection of any
39. Ball, supra note 32, at B13 (noting that Latin Americans' contempt for capi-
talism was demonstrated at President Kirchner's inauguration in Argentina when
Fidel Castro, the strongest opponent of capitalism in this hemisphere, received a
standing ovation).
40. Haluani, supra note 34, at 51.
41. For statutory text, see Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-171 § 1103, 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.). See also id..; Carranza, supra note 27, at 1063 &
n. 102 (noting that in 2002 President Bush imposed steel tariffs, which were eventu-
ally cancelled in December 2003 to avoid retaliatory tariffs from the European Un-
ion and Japan) (citing Dan Freeman, Steel May Test Bush Mettle, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 5, 2003, at IA).
42. Carranza, supra note 27, at 1063.
43. Id. at 1057 (discussing Brazil's insistence on agricultural concessions from
the United States, while the United States maintains that it is a non-negotiable
matter); Carranza, supra note 27, at 1050 (noting that the United States wants to
exclude farm subsidies from the FTAA negotiations and instead utilize the WTO
framework in the Doha Round of global trade talks); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institu-
tionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food, Security, and De-
veloping Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 455-58 (2002) (arguing that the
text of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture gives countries enough flexibility to pro-
tect their agricultural industries); Andres Oppenheimer, Latin Nations Fear Free-
trade Scales Tip Toward U.S., AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 4, 2003, at 3, 2003 WL
2491245.
44. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1057 (discussing that Brazil does not think
that the United States is seriously committed to the FTAA because the United
States refuses to offer reciprocal concessions).
45. The Dragon and the Eagle, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 6.
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developing nation in the world. 46
There is wide disappointment in capitalism and in democ-
racy among many Latin Americans. Political and economic
movements in Latin America made up of unions, farmers, and
Indian groups are becoming more common and powerful. 47 The
adjustments that Latin Americans have made for globalization
have damaged certain sectors of their economies, particularly in
infrastructure-related areas such as transportation, communica-
tions, and technology. 48 Many Latin Americans have lost faith
in the democratic process and in politicians. 49 They have re-
sorted to voting for priests, ex-coup leaders, and inexperienced
populists, 50 many of whom have successfully encouraged suspi-
cion of capitalism. 51
Many Latin Americans feel that the United States does not
treat their countries as equal partners. An integral part of the
Hispanic culture can be summed up with the word cortesia,
meaning courtesy. 52 It is this system of "courtesies, traditions,
and values that bind Latin American society." 53 However, in-
stead of respecting this cultural understanding, the United
States has alternated between bullying and ignoring Latin
America. 54 Latin Americans believe that during its War on Ter-
46. Id. The Chinese yuan was pegged to the U.S. dollar at an artificially low
rate. Id. at 14, 16. Pegging the yuan to the U.S. dollar helps keep China's exports
competitive, which creates jobs for their many underemployed workers. Id. This
has also helped China double its foreign-exchange reserves to $480 billion, most of it
in U.S. government securities. Id. In a sense, China is financing the U.S. current-
account deficit. Id.
47. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8 (noting that "Indians, landless peoples, urban
poor, and others" are increasing in outspokenness and power). "Frustration with
broken promises and worsening conditions has also meant that popular protests re-
main a key part of the region's democratic process." Id.
48. See Jodo P. Koslovski, A Strategic View of Negotiations Between Brazilian
Agricultural Cooperatives and the WTO, at http://www.agricoop.org/activities/
ICAO%20Koslovski.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2005) (discussing that fast pace and
fierce competition has led to policies that have hurt infrastructure projects through-
out the region).
49. Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform-or Muddle Along?, ECONOMIST, Jul.
17, 2004, at 35; Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8 ("A 2004 United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) report entitled "Democracy in Latin America"... concluded that
nearly fifty-five percent of the region's inhabitants would prefer an authoritarian
government to a democratic one if it could better their economic circumstances.").
50. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8.
51. See David Luhnow, Free Markets Spur Protest, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2004,
at A18.
52. Friedman, supra note 2, at 5 (defining "cortesia" as "a system of courtesies,
traditions, and values that bind Latin American society").
53. Id.
54. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 6 (noting that "skeptics are likely wondering
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ror, the United States seems to have forgotten Latin America. 55
Even before the preoccupation with the War on Terror, U.S. em-
bassies in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico had no ambassadors
for a period of at least two years during the 1990's.56 This lack
of cortesia and other sources of friction have created the oppor-
tunity for an economic and political alternative-China replacing
the United States.
B. CHINA'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES
1. China's Growing Economic Clout
In 1979, General Secretary of the Communist Party, Deng
Xiaoping, initiated economic reform that transformed China
from a control economy to a market economy.57 During the
1990s China set up economic zones to encourage foreign compa-
nies to open plants and factories.58 Since that time, foreign
trade has been liberalized, 59 financial markets have been cre-
ated,60 China's gross national product has grown dramatically, 61
and ties with neighboring countries have improved.62 In 2003,
due to foreign direct investment, China exported $438 billion
worth of goods.63 China's gross domestic product accounts for
whether Latin America really matters to the United States any more, considering
the urgency of current events in the Middle East and Central Asia").
55. Id.
56. Cynthia A. Watson, That Sinking Feeling Again: Deterioration in U.S.-
Latin American Relations, NAT'L STRATEGY F. REV., Spring 2001, available at
http://www.nationalstrategy.com/nsr/vlOn3SpringO1/100319.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2005).
57. Steven L. Chan, Book Note, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 211, 211 (1995) (re-
viewing WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS
CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER (1993)) (discussing that China broke up collective
farms, began its manufacturing drive, and invited foreign investment).
58. Michael O'Boyle, The China Threat, Bus. MEX., Oct. 1, 2003, at 30.
59. WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS
CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER 30 (1993).
60. Id. at 45-46.
61. Id. at 29-30.
62. Id. at 321-22.
63. Neil King, Jr., A Whole New World, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at R1, 2004
WL-WSJ 56941795 (noting that during the 1980s, foreign manufacturers in Taiwan,
Japan, and South Korea opened factories in China in order to take advantage of the
cheap labor, in the late 1990s, dozens of multinational corporations opened factories
in China, and from 2000 to 2003, as many as 60,000 new factories were opened in
China by foreign companies); The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 4 (noting
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thirteen percent of world output, second only to the United
States. 64 China's gross domestic product grew approximately
nine percent and eight percent in 2003 and 2002, respectively, 65
and its economic expansion has averaged almost eight percent
per year between 1999 and 2003.66
Some economists think that China's economy will cool and
that its expectations are overblown. 67 Other economists believe
that China's financial system is unable to allocate capital effi-
ciently, thereby lowering its return on investment. 68 However,
most economists predict that China will grow no less than seven
or eight percent per year between 2004 and 2008.69 China has
many attractive qualities for foreign investors such as an end-
less supply of Chinese low-skilled laborers who work long days
at forty cents per hour. 70 At the upper end of the market, Chi-
nese schools produce competent engineers that can be hired for
as little as $3,000 per year.71 China also offers an enormous
domestic market. 72 According to China expert Daniel Rosen, a
fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washing-
ton, D.C., "China offers great production costs for exporting to
the global market, but it also offers a domestic market with
that China is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment and that within one
decade it could be the world's largest exporter and importer, enough to overtake the
United States and become the world's largest economy).
64. The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 4.
65. Phelim Kyne, Foreign Investment in China Remains Strong, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 2004, at A15.
66. Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35.
67. See The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 6 (discussing that China
suffers serious problems that may curtail its growth, such as a fragile banking sys-
tem, widespread corruption, environmental pollution, and the risk of social and po-
litical unrest exacerbated by income inequalities and continuing human rights
abuses).
68. See id. at 7-8 (noting that China has over-invested in sectors such as cars
and steel and therefore some projects will not be profitable).
69. Latin America: Made in China, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT-Bus. LATIN
AM., Apr. 12, 2004, at 3, 2004 WL 63625618.
70. O'Boyle, supra note 58; Don Bauder, China Factor Involves a Hefty Helping
of Angst, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 19, 2003, at C1, 2003 WL 6566972 (discuss-
ing that Chinese manufacturing wages average sixty cents per hour, which is five
percent of the average U.S. laborer and ten percent of other Asian laborers).
71. O'Boyle, supra note 58; Mei Fong, et al., Chinese Manufacturers Are Closing
Quality Gap, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2004, at A17. Ernest Preeg, a senior fellow in
trade and productivity at the research institute Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI, pre-
dicts that China will surpass Japan and move into a "three-way relationship with
the U.S. and Europe in the area of advanced technology products" within the next
decade. Id.
72. The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that China's imports
grew by forty percent in 2003).
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enormous growth potential."73
2. China's Investments in Key Sectors in Latin America: Oil,
Commodities, and Infrastructures
China's high demand for commodities has driven up the
price of metals, agricultural products, and oil.7 4 China is a ma-
jor importer of raw materials, a plentiful commodity in Latin
America.75 This makes doing business with China very attrac-
tive to Latin American countries, especially Brazil.7 6 For exam-
ple, China's top steel maker, Baosteel, is considering a joint ven-
ture with Brazil's Companhia Vale de Rio Doce, the world's top
iron ore miner.77
Latin America and the Caribbean provide over thirty per-
cent of U.S. imported oil, which is more than all of the Middle
Eastern countries combined.7 8 But China is not just securing oil
and commodities from Latin American countries, it is becoming
intimately involved in its extraction, transportation and infra-
structure construction.7 9 China's approach has been to show
Latin American countries that, unlike the United States, it will
treat them as sovereigns and as partners.
In 2003, trade between China and Brazil totaled eight bil-
lion dollars, making China Brazil's second-largest trading part-
73. O'Boyle, supra note 58.
74. See Latin America. Made in China, supra note 69, at 3; Brian Bremner and
Dexter Roberts, The Great Oil Hunt, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 2004, at 60; see What has
China Cost Mexico, LATIN AM., MEXICO & NAFTA REP., Mar. 9, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Mexico & Nafta Report File (noting that China's oil imports increased one-
third in 2003 and that some forecasters expect China to import as much oil in 2020
as did the world's largest oil importer, the United States, in 2003); The Dragon and
the Eagle, supra note 45, at 12 (asserting that China's demand for oil is maintaining
high oil prices worldwide). According to the International Energy Agency, China's
increase in annual demand for oil in 2004 will be approximately fifteen percent
greater than the increase in 2003, with a daily consumption of over six million bar-
rels per day. Jeffrey Ball, Efforts to Reduce U.S. Addiction to Oil Are Few, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 28, 2004, at A8.
75. Latin America: Made in China, supra note 69.
76. Id. (discussing China's future role as a leader of investment in the region,
especially in Brazil).
77. Id. (noting that China is also an important market for Peru's metals, as
well as Mexican and Venezuelan oil).
78. Hearings, supra note 5, at 3.
79. See supra text accompanying note 77; Venezuelan PDVSA to Invest in
China, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG., Sept. 10, 2004, 2004 WL 82097926 [hereinafter
PDVSA] (noting that China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is involved in
forty projects in thirty-two countries worldwide including Venezuela's state oil com-
pany Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)).
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ner after the United States.8 0 Brazil is China's largest trading
partner in Latin America and annual bilateral trade has tripled
since 2000.81 Both countries recently took part in a workshop
entitled "Brazil and China in the 21st Century," at which Chi-
nese entrepreneurs sought Brazilian partners in economic sec-
tors such as oil and agriculture.8 2 China seeks to invest directly
in Brazil's infrastructure,8 3 where it has agreed to invest be-
tween $3 billion and $4 billion in railways and refineries.8 4
With Argentina, China seeks not only bilateral trade
agreements but also to become an investment partner, particu-
larly in the infrastructure and transportation sectors.8 5 To this
end, Argentine President, Nestor Kirchner, and Chinese Presi-
dent, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement on June 28, 2004, which
enables both countries to jointly begin construction of a railway
and allows Argentina to export its citrus fruit to China.8 6
Realizing that it must work with China because it cannot
compete against it, Mexico has decided to increase its explora-
tion and production of oil to satisfy China's demand.87 In Feb-
ruary 2004, Mexico held a conference entitled "China's Influence
on Mexico's Future," at which Mexico's ambassador to China
80. Latin America: Made in China, supra note 69.
81. See Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35 and accompanying text (reporting
that annual trade between Brazil and China should reach $10 billion in 2005).
82. See Brazil Exports to China at $1.1 Bln Q1 2004, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG.,
Apr. 27, 2004, 2004 WL 65869970 [hereinafter Brazil Exports]. China currently im-
ports steel products, pulp and paper, chemical, and plastic products from Brazil. Id.
83. Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35.
84. China Mulls Up to $4 Bln Investments in Brazil, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG.,
Apr. 15, 2004, 2004 WL 65869461 (noting that Chinese companies are primarily in-
terested in investing in railways, oil and refineries, and raw materials, including an
important railway project connecting Brazil to the Pacific ports of Chile); see also
Brazil, China Sign MOUs on Chinese Investment in Energy Projects, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAc., Sept. 8, 2004, 2004 90389170 (noting that China has also
expressed interest in expanding investments in Brazil's Free Trade Zone of
Manaus).
85. See Argentina to Export Citrus Fruit to China, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG., June
30, 2004, 2004 WL 82096240 [hereinafter Fruit to China] (discussing that Argentina
will shortly start exporting citrus fruit to China, which could reach $150 million per
year, while China will also work on investment and joint projects in Argentina, in-
cluding a railway construction project).
86. See id.
87. See What has China Cost Mexico, supra note 74 ("Mexico cannot expect to
compete successfully with China because... China's labour is cheaper and, argua-
bly, its supply chain (infrastructure, electricity, logistics) is more efficient."). Mex-
ico's share of U.S. imports fell in 2002 because it has been undercut in the U.S. mar-
ket by China. Id. Mexico is starting to develop a policy that will allow it to make
use of its comparative advantages. Id. It plans, for example, to follow Brazil's lead
and will supply China with the commodities that China needs, primarily oil. Id.
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announced that Mexico will increase its oil output to meet
China's demands.88
China has agreed to invest in Venezuela's state oil com-
pany, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).89 Venezuela's Foreign
Minister met with the managers of China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) in order to establish a strategic alliance
over the exploration, transformation, and transportation of
crude oil, including upgrading necessary infrastructure. 90
China also has indicated interest in investing $3 billion in Ec-
uador, primarily in its oil sector.91
China is even courting smaller, sometimes forgotten coun-
tries. China expressed interest in investing in the construction
of a new canal through Central America.92 The proposed canal
would cost $20 billion and would utilize Lake Nicaragua and one
river in southeast Nicaragua. 93 Guyana and China enjoy bilat-
eral economic and technical cooperation. 94 President Hu Jintao
said that China is willing to develop relations with Caribbean
countries that would be of mutual benefit to Latin America and
China.95 This cooperation increases access for Latin American
businesses to the growing Chinese consumer market.
88. Mexico: Eyeing Oil Exports to China, LATIN NEWS DAILY, Feb. 24, 2004,
2004 WL 67935290.
89. PDVSA, supra note 79 (noting that China's investment in the Venezuelan
petroleum industry will strengthen China and Venezuela's strategic alliance).
90. Id.; see also Chinese Yankuang to Start Railroad Repair Works in Vene-
zuela, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG., Sept. 20, 2004, 2004 WL 82098141 (reporting that
China will invest $3 billion to repair a railroad network linking central and western
Venezuela).
91. China Reportedly Interested in Investing in Ecuadoran Oil, BBC
MONITORING LATIN AM., Jan. 7, 2003, 2004 WL 4133432 [hereinafter Ecuador] (re-
porting that the Chinese government invited a government delegation of Ecuadori-
ans to China, "which facilitated contacts for meetings with board members from the
Sinopeg Oil Company, China's largest refinery, and the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) in order to attract foreign investment to Ecuador").
92. Chinese Govt. Interested in Interocean Canal Investment, BUS. NEWS AM.,
Sept. 2, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business News Americas File (reporting that,
unlike the Panama Canal, the new canal would be able to accommodate ships of
250,000 tons, many of which transport iron-ore from Brazil and Venezuela to China;
the Panama Canal can accommodate ships no heavier than 50,000 tons).
93. Id.
94. Hu Xiao, Leaders Seek Expansion of Cooperation, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 28,
2003, 2003 WL 3053610 (naming various cooperative projects between Guyana and
China in industry, agriculture, and hydroelectric energy).
95. See id. (noting that President Hu Jintao expressed understanding for the
challenges that Caribbean countries face in the global market).
2005] 389
390 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 14:2
3. Chinese Market Attractiveness to Latin American Countries
Eager to obtain new customers, foreign manufacturers and
distributors want to tap into all areas of the growing Chinese
market.96 China is rapidly creating the largest middle class in
the world, which will have tremendous buying power. 97 Foreign
direct investment in China increased nineteen percent, to $43.6
billion, from January to August 2004 alone.98 China consumes
an increasing amount of oil and commodities and it opened its
agricultural market because it needs to import great quantities
of food.99
Latin American leaders welcome an economic power that
treats them as true partners and provides an attractive eco-
nomic alternative to dealing with the United States.100 The
trade trip to China by Brazil's president in May of 2004 under-
scores this point.101 Given China's needs for the raw materials
that Latin American countries have and given China's coopera-
tion in infrastructure and satellite technology development, it
appears as though China, Brazil, and other Latin American
countries are entering an era of greater cooperation. 102
96. Cf. China/Brazil Bilateral Trade to Hit US$5 Bil-Serbia to Increase Busi-
ness with Brazil, VALOR ECONOMICO, July 2, 2003, 2004 WL 65878955 [hereinafter
China/Brazil] (noting as an example that Embraer, one of the largest Brazilian air-
craft manufacturers, has partnered with a Chinese company to install its first as-
sembly line in China because "China has become an important focus to the com-
pany").
97. O'Boyle, supra note 58, at 32; see China/Brazil, supra note 96.
98. Kyne, supra note 65, at A15. For a discussion predicting China's future,
see Kenneth Lieberthal, China in 2033, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 44.
99. Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35 (reporting that China, Brazil's third-
largest customer, has a strong demand for Brazil's soya beans and that exports to
China of Brazilian soya beans and iron ore account for approximately sixty-eight
percent of Brazil's total exports to China); see also Chile, China Review Joint FTA
Economic Study Progress, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG., June 4, 2004, 2004 WL 65871224
(noting that trade delegations from the two countries recently agreed on a plan for
Chile to export fruit to China in 2004).
100. See O'Grady, supra note 1.
101. See Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35.
102. See id.; Brazilian Foreign Minister Interviewed on Ties with China, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAc., Mar. 29, 2004, 2004 WL 72819223 (noting that Brazilian
Minister of Foreign Relations, Ambassador Celso Amorim, spoke highly of the
achievements Brazil and China have made through cooperation in the science, tech-
nology, and cultural fields and remarked that there is still huge potential for further
development of trade relations).
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C. LATIN AMERICA AND U.S. INTERESTS
1. U.S. Oil Interests
Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, has stated that President Bush's policy on
Latin America "is based on promoting democracy through pro-
grams aimed at curbing corruption and improving education,
promoting trade, and fighting drug trafficking."'10 3 Latin Amer-
ica is also an essential source of oil for the United States. 04 As
China gains more clout in Latin America, the United States may
obtain less cooperation from Latin American countries with re-
gard to securing oil, promoting human rights, expanding
antinarcotics programs, fighting terrorism, assuring U.S. na-
tional security, promoting democracy and higher environmental
standards, and reaching long-term trade agreements. 105
It is imperative for the United States to secure future
sources of oil from Latin America. Twenty percent of U.S. en-
ergy originates in the Andean countries, which comprise Colom-
bia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 106 Fourteen of that
twenty percent originates in Venezuela. 107 Unrest in Venezuela
and other oil-producing countries in Latin America as well as
rising anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the region may jeopardize
the United States's access to Latin American oil.108 The election
103. Lorente, supra note 27.
104. See Alfredo Corchado, Summit Starts in Mexico: Hemisphere Needs Hope,
Analysts Say, as Fox Hosts Bush, Other Leaders, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 12,
2004, 2004 WL 56658272; Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform--or Muddle Along?,
supra note 49.
105. See O'Grady, supra note 1, at All. The author states the following con-
cerns:
The rise of China in the region could complicate U.S. efforts to control ille-
gal immigration, weapons shipments, the drug trade and money launder-
ing because China is cooperating with Latin countries that are not espe-
cially friendly toward those efforts. Some of these nations may try to use
the Chinese alternative to challenge U.S. hegemony.
Id.
106. See Corchado, supra note 104, at Al.
107. Id.
108. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 4 (discussing that until recently, Mexico had
only one political party and it has a ten-year-old, growing insurgency that opposes
NAFTA). In Venezuela, President Chavez recently won a referendum to stay in
power by urging voters to vote for him in order to defy the United States. Id. Co-
lombia is the heart of the "War on Drugs," and it has the longest running civil war in
this hemisphere. Id. Argentina suffered an economic crisis in 2001 that forced half
the population into poverty. Id. Brazil would likely oppose a regional free trade
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of leftist leaders to positions of power and a movement through-
out Latin America to nationalize the oil industry further add to
this potential decrease in U.S. access to Latin American oil.109
2. Human Right and Narcotics Trafficking
For years the United States has worked to promote human
rights throughout Latin America. In contrast, on June 4, 1989
in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, hundreds of student demonstra-
tors who were advocating for greater freedom were killed by sol-
diers in the Chinese army.110 Fifteen years later, some of the
surviving students remain in prison as do many political prison-
ers.1 1 In the meantime, democratic countries in Latin America
and Europe have been willing to overlook China's violations of
human rights.112 On the global scale, China's economic invest-
ments in other countries, like the Sudan, have frustrated U.S.
efforts to promote human rights. 13
agreement. Id. See generally Hearings, supra note 5, at 535 (noting that the volatil-
ity in the Middle East makes Latin American oil supply even more imperative).
109. See generally Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform-or Muddle Along?; su-
pra note 49 (noting that Venezuela relies on multinational corporations to produce
oil but President Chavez is working to establish Petrosur, a regional state-owned
company, to increase government control of the oil sector). Argentina's President
Kirchner has also announced his intention to create a new state oil company. Id. In
Bolivia, the leftist groups that overthrew President Gonzalo Sinchez de Lozada are
pushing for the re-nationalization of the oil industry. Id.
110. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 739 (1990) (dis-
cussing that the students involved in the Tiananmen Square massacre wanted
greater democratic involvement in government decisions to eradicate the widespread
corruption and nepotism of communist party members).
111. Don't Lift the Arms Ban, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 13-14; see generally
Sheryl WuDunn & Nicholas Kristof, China's Rush to Riches, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept.
4, 1994, at 38 (noting that China imprisons human rights campaigners).
112. See O'Grady, supra note 1, at All (noting that China has won observer
status in the Organization of American States (OAS), an organization that promotes
democracy throughout the Americas, and that the status enables China-as an offi-
cial observer of democracy in Latin America-to oversee processes that ensure that
democracy is stable in the Americas); Don't Lift the Arms Ban, supra note 111, at 13
(noting that some European countries, especially France, have called for lifting the
arms ban imposed on China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, calling the inci-
dent an "anachronism").
113. China is an outspoken opponent of the possibility of the United Nations in-
tervention in the Sudan, where the Muslim government allegedly authorized the
slaughter of thousands of Christians. See Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily
In Sudan's Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on Villagers, WASH. POST.,
Dec. 23, 2004, at Al, 2004 WL 101232209; Peter S. Goodman, China Stakes a Claim
in Sudan, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 28, 2004, at A12, 2004 WL-WSJE 88764516. Pet-
roChina owns forty percent of the Unity fields in Sudan. China PetroChina Forms
Overseas Arm, CHINA ECON. REV., Nov. 29, 2001, at 15, 2001 WL 12686738 (noting
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The United States has been expanding antinarcotics pro-
grams. One way in which it has encouraged cooperation from
Latin America is through trade agreements such as the Andean
Trade Preference Act. 114 This type of cooperation is also impor-
tant in the War on Terror since drug trafficking fuels terror
groups worldwide.
3. Promotion of Democracy in Latin America
One major U.S. interest is the promotion of democracy
throughout Latin America. China is a communist country that
considers democracy an impediment to progress. Some regional
and economic experts believe that China will evolve from an au-
thoritarian regime to a successful democratic society, as did
South Korea and Japan. 115 However, the Communist Party is
tightening its grip on Chinese society and it is doubtful that
China will truly welcome democratic policies. 116 China had a
chance to show the world that it would move towards democracy
that PetroChina is the listed unit of China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC)).
114. See Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3102 (2002):
Congress makes the following findings:...
(2) The Andean Trade Preference Act has been a key element in the United
States counternarcotics strategy in the Andean region, promoting export
diversification and broad-based economic development that provides sus-
tainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production, strengthening the
legitimate economies of Andean countries and creating viable alternatives
to illicit trade in coca....
(4) The continuing instability in the Andean region poses a threat to the se-
curity interests of the United States and the world. This problem has been
partially addressed through foreign aid, such as Plan Colombia, enacted by
Congress in 2000. However, foreign aid alone is not sufficient. Enhance-
ment of legitimate trade with the United States provides an alternative
means for reviving and stabilizing the economies in the Andean region.
(5) The Andean Trade Preference Act constitutes a tangible commitment by
the United States to the promotion of prosperity, stability, and democracy
in the beneficiary countries.
Id. § 3102.
115. OVERHOLT, supra note 59, at 137 (noting that political liberalization has
occurred largely because of a change in social structure that accompanies economic
reform, rather than a change in government policies).
116. Hu Done It, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2004, at 14 (noting that President Hu
Jintao holds three positions: President, General Secretary of the Communist Party,
and head of the party's military commission); Lieberthal, supra note 98, at 48 (dis-
cussing the possibility that if China succeeds in managing the challenges it faces, in
2033 China will likely continue to be an authoritarian one-party system linked to
domestic business elites while keeping the lower classes engaged through the pro-
motion of a nationalist commitment).
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when it took control of Hong Kong in 1999, but instead it chose
to curtail democracy by prohibiting elections for certain gov-
ernment positions in Hong Kong.117
Many Latin Americans do not want to let the free forces of
the market dictate, nor have they seen the benefits of democ-
racy. 118 Many of them are willing to take their chances with an
authoritarian government. 119 Latin American presidents are
frequently forced to resign and are replaced by leftist groups
that oppose globalization.12o Yet, U.S. administrations have not
given enough attention to this disturbing and growing senti-
ment.121
4. Environmental Standards, Market Share, and an Economic
Alternative
While the United States has provisions for environmental
standards in its trade agreements, it is doubtful that China will
let environmental concerns slow its economic progress in Latin
America. 122 China has experienced economic growth at the ex-
pense of its environment, containing nine of the world's ten most
polluted cities. 123 Chronic respiratory disease has become the
117. Suffrage on Sufferance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2004, at 47 (noting that the
Chinese government refused to allow elections for Hong Kong's Chief Executive post
and for more democratic elections for its Legislative Council in 2007 and 2008).
118. In Mexico, forty-five percent of those surveyed in late 2003 said that
NAFTA had benefited their economy, down from sixty-eight percent who thought
that NAFTA would benefit Mexico in 1993. See Corchado, supra note 104, at Al.
According to Latin Barometer Corp., a Chile-based polling organization, fifty-three
percent of people polled want democratic governments, but only twenty-eight per-
cent say that they see benefits of democracy at work. Id.
119. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8 (citing a 2004 UN report which found that
fifty-five percent of the inhabitants of Latin America would prefer an authoritarian
government to a democratic government if it provided a better economic situation).
120. Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform-or Muddle Along?, supra note 49, at
35 (reporting that leftist groups in Bolivia who led a violent uprising that forced
President Sanchez de Lozada to resign in October 2003 are pressing the new gov-
ernment to re-nationalize the oil and gas industries).
121. See Selmeski, supra note 38, at 12-13 (noting that the United States has
ignored the fact that some Latin American democracies are faltering, and providing
a list of recommendations for ways in which U.S. administrators can work to stabi-
lize Latin America and reach U.S. objectives).
122. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 12 (describing the envi-
ronmental review process of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement as required by the
Trade Act of 2002); O'Grady, supra note 105, at All (quoting Cynthia Watson, a pro-
fessor of strategy at the National War College in Washington, who stated that in or-
der to satisfy its targeted need to find energy sources, China will treat Latin Ameri-
can nations as sovereigns rather than "preach to them").
123. Lieberthal, supra note 98, at 46.
2005] China's Clout Grows in Latin America
leading cause of death in the country.124
Chinese manufacturers have been gaining market share in
industries where Mexico lost market share. 125 By mid-2003,
China surpassed Mexico as the second-largest supplier of goods
to the United States. 126 China has erased many of Mexico's eco-
nomic advantages that the United States and Mexico had
worked hard for years to obtain under NAFTA.127
China may be able to develop greater clout relative to the
United States with small countries that depend on the textile
industry. As China imports great quantities of raw materials
and exports labor-intensive manufactured goods, it drives down
the price of its exports and it increases the price of raw materi-
als that it imports. 128 Poor countries that depend on the textile
industry will earn lower prices for their exports and will have to
pay higher prices for their raw materials.1 29 China has an im-
portant bargaining chip with these countries that the United
States does not.
Some countries, particularly Cuba, have looked to China to
counter-balance the United States's world power.1 30 After the
fall of the Soviet Union, China became Cuba's political and fi-
124. Id. (discussing that as China emerges as an economic power, the Chinese
people are paying a high price with their declining health, especially in the large cit-
ies); see also A Great Wall of Waste, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2004, at 55, 56 (citing the
World Bank estimation that 300,000 people per year die prematurely from respira-
tory diseases in China).
125. See O'Boyle, supra note 58, at 33 (reporting the U.S. government's estima-
tion that about eighty-five percent of world production could end up in China).
126. Id. at 31.
127. China to Surpass Mexico in Trade with U.S., EFE NEWS SERV., May 14,
2003, WL EFE News Serv. File (noting that Mario Abedrop, who heads COMCE's
(Mexico's Foreign Trade Council) Mexico-China Committee, stated that the NAFTA
bloc's benefits to Mexico have gradually eroded); see also O'Boyle, supra note 58, at
33 (noting that Mexican exports to the United States have decreased while Chinese
exports to the United States have increased for similar goods).
128. The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 10 (noting that the average
prices of shoes and clothing in America has fallen by thirty percent in real terms
over the past ten years).
129. Id. In 1995, one hundred and twenty three nations agreed to end textile
quotas, in part, because rich nations were using them to protect domestic industries.
Scott Miller & Charles Hutzler, Poor Nations Seek WTO Textile Aid, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2004, at A2 (noting that in Latin America, textile-dependent countries in-
clude El Salvador and the Dominican Republic). In the past decade, however, rich
nations have outsourced production primarily to China. Id. China now rejects any
new quotas or safeguards and instead stated that it will work to resolve these issues
directly with these countries that depend on the textile industry. Id.
130. Vanessa Bauza, Castro Observes New China; Cuban President's Visit Calls
for Increasing Relationships, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 1, 2003, at 21A, 2003 WL
14868710; O'Grady, supra note 1, at All.
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nancial partner.13 1 China and Cuba are involved in biotechnol-
ogy joint ventures and arms trade. 132 They jointly operate an
electronic warfare facility in Cuba, which is connected to
China's global satellite network. 133 Together they monitor U.S.
telephone conversations and Internet data.134
Due to the United States's relative decline in the global
economy and its continued dependence on foreign capital in or-
der to finance current account deficits, Latin American govern-
ments, especially Brazil and Argentina, see a window of eco-
nomic opportunity. 135  The window gives Latin American
countries a chance to develop their own economic policies. This
opportunity is even more important considering a possible
merger of the two largest trading blocs in South America: The
Andean Community and Mercosur. 136 If such a merger occurs,
the promise of increased bargaining power for these countries
may prove fatal to the proposed FTAA.
D. CHINESE LEVERAGE
With China's growing sphere of influence and economic
clout comes leverage that it may use to frustrate U.S. interests
and to gain support for diplomatic, political, and perhaps mili-
131. See Vanessa Bauza, Castro Marvels at Changed China since his '95 Visit,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 2, 2003, at A17, 2003 WL 14540822 (noting that Castro
met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin who has provided millions of dollars in
economic aid to Cuba).
132. See Bauza, supra note 130 (noting that in 2001, James Kelly, assistant Sec-
retary of State for East Asian affairs stated that the Chinese had delivered military
equipment to Cuba and that Chinese military delegations have visited Cuba re-
cently).
133. O'Grady, supra note 1, at All.
134. Id. China already presents special security concerns for the United States
since it has been working with Iran to develop anti-ship cruise missiles. See World-
wide Threats to Intelligence Community: Hearing before the Senate Select Intelli-
gence Comm., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby),
2003 WL 294958.
135. Carranza, supra note 27, at 1037 (discussing how U.S. economic weak-
nesses have negatively affected its ability to control Latin America). The United
States is currently dependant on foreign capital as a means through which to fi-
nance its current account deficits. Id. Latin American countries now have an oppor-
tunity to develop their own foreign economic policies. Id.; see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
136. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1061-62 (noting that the Andean Commu-
nity (comprised of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru) and the MERCOSUR
(comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) have incentives to create a
greater trading bloc, which will give these groups greater bargaining power with
NAFTA countries including the United States).
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tary initiatives. 13 7 Much like the former Soviet Union's power-
ful control over its "member" countries, communist China may
have similar leverage over Latin American countries. If China
reaches this level of influence and if the United States confronts
China on an economic, political, or military matter, no Latin
American country could economically afford to oppose China. 138
Moreover, the United States itself may not be in a position to
oppose China.
The trade disparity between the United States and China is
the greatest of any country pair in the world: China exports
$114 billion worth of goods to the United States and imports
only $20 billion from the United States.1 39 U.S. manufacturers
have opened factories in China, predicting that in the next five
years technology manufacturing will be centered there.140 In
the event of a confrontation, the United States may lose 100,000
export-oriented jobs.1 4 1 The United States must realize that the
Chinese threat is real and it must examine its own policies to-
wards Latin America before China's leverage can no longer be
countered.
II. THE CHINESE THREAT, THE FTAA STUMBLING
BLOCK, AND A RECOMMENDED U.S. PLAN OF ACTION
China is securing bilateral agreements, forming partner-
ships with Latin American companies and governments, build-
ing and repairing infrastructure, and treating Latin American
leaders as equals and always with cortesia. As a result, China is
becoming an attractive economic alternative for Latin American
countries that have historically been forced to deal predomi-
nately with the United States.142 The United States cannot af-
ford to distance itself from oil-producing countries in this hemi-
sphere nor can it afford to ignore countries that may help it
137. WuDunn & Kristof, supra note 111, at 54.
138. See generally OVERHOLT, supra note 59 (arguing that as foreign trade be-
tween China and Latin America increases, Latin American countries will become
economically dependant on China).
139. Bauder, supra note 70.
140. Id. (noting that high technology manufacturers like Dell, Intel and Royal
Philips Electronics have already made plans to base technology manufacturing in
China).
141. OVERHOLT, supra note 59, at 394; see also Irwin M. Stelzer, An LBJ Con-
servative. . ., WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 1, 2004 at 18 (discussing how Chinese currency
is affecting the U.S. economy).
142. Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35.
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promote democracy, human rights, and its other interests. The
United States should be aware of a future threat posed by a po-
tentially aggressive China that is economically tied to Latin
America. The United States should counter China's actions
with favorable bilateral trade agreements.
A. THE CHINA THREAT
1. Oil
Securing oil for future demand is imperative. While the
United States works to secure oil in a volatile Middle East,
China is quietly forming partnerships with the key oil-
producing countries of Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador. 143 In
forming these partnerships, China is creating jobs throughout
Latin America and offering economic cooperation, joint partner-
ships, infrastructure construction, and over one billion new con-
sumers. 144 In addition to agreeing to future purchases of oil,
China is involved in the actual extraction and transportation of
oil and also in the building of infrastructure to support the oil
industry. 145
The threat of China's growing interest in Latin American oil
is evident in light of two alarming and related trends: anti-U.S.
sentiment is on the rise and socialist leaders are coming to
power. These leaders are moving towards state control of the oil
industry.146 If anti-U.S. leftist leaders control twenty percent of
the oil that the U.S. imports, an oil embargo against the United
States would become a frightening prospect, especially in the
event of a U.S. military confrontation with China.147
The United States should build on its existing relationships
with oil-producing countries in Latin America. Like China, it
should establish partnerships in order to secure oil for its future
consumption beyond maximum current output. For example,
the United States currently consumes all of the oil that Mexico
exports. Given the energy shortages in the United States since
143. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
145. See generally supra notes 79, 90-91 and accompanying text.
146. See Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform--or Muddle Along?, supra note
49, at 36; supra note 109 and accompanying text.
147. For a general discussion of Latin America's potential economic dependence
on China and how it may not be economically feasible for Latin America to defy
China, see infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
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2000, U.S. companies should have partnered with Mexican firms
to increase Mexico's oil production. Instead, China and Mexico
are taking steps to jointly develop Mexico's oil industry so that
Mexico can expand its production and export capacity. 148 Like
China, the United States must invest in the infrastructure that
will allow for successful joint exploration for oil and other com-
modities. Infrastructure projects provide a large incentive for
Latin American countries to trade with China since these pro-
jects will improve their infrastructure, employ thousands of
workers throughout their countries, and bring economic oppor-
tunities to small towns.
By partnering with Latin American private and public oil
firms, the United States could increase regional oil production
and secure added capacity for itself. Moreover, by addressing
Latin American infrastructure needs, the United States will
bring jobs and other economic opportunities to the region and in
the process dissipate anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America.
2. Democracy and Human Rights
In a democratic country, elected leaders are held account-
able by their constituents. In an authoritarian or communist
country, there are no such checks and balances. While some
dictators or communist leaders are benign, there is no political
safeguard that will prevent future, malevolent leaders from tak-
ing aggressive action against their own people or other coun-
tries. In the event that citizens protest, non-democratic leaders
will quickly silence dissidents and continue to act with impu-
nity.149 The safest way to ensure peace and cooperation is to
promote democracy and respect for human rights.
China's growing influence in Latin America represents a
risk to unstable democracies in the region. If unchecked,
China's economic prominence will cause fragile democracies in
Latin America to think twice about the supposed benefits of de-
mocracy, capitalism, and globalization.1 50 There is a common
misconception that, since Latin American countries are democ-
148. See generally What has China Cost Mexico, supra note 74; supra note 87
and accompanying text.
149. See generally SPENCE, supra note 110, at 739-44.
150. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See generally Carranza, supra
note 27, at 1048 (noting that negative reactions to globalizations have led to the re-
moval of four presidents in the Latin American countries of Ecuador (2000), Peru
(2000), Argentina (2001), and Bolivia (2003)); Corchado, supra note 104.
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racies (with the exception of Cuba), democracy is permanent. 151
Based on the reversing trends of the past four years, it is evi-
dent that regional democracy is unstable. 152 As more socialist
presidents are elected throughout Latin America and faith in
the benefits of democracy and capitalism diminish, Latin Ameri-
cans may begin to favor authoritarian regimes. 153 As China in-
vests heavily in the region, bringing jobs and providing access to
Latin American producers for over one-and-a-half billion Chi-
nese consumers, Latin American voters may begin to believe
that communism can really work. Communist China offers
Latin American countries an opportunity to see the economic
benefits of such a system.
The vices of communism have been evident throughout the
twentieth century. Unlike Karl Marx's stateless, classless,
communist nation, "communist" countries have actually been
ruthless in their pursuit of party loyalty and obedience.15 4
Unlike the moderate, evolutionary, and law-abiding outlook that
intellectuals had for communism in the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, history has proven that the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat has in fact suppressed expression, human rights, and
other freedoms that people hold dear.155 While the United
States often offers trade incentives as a reward for adherence to
principles of human rights, China is likely to disregard such re-
quirements. 156
3. Loss of U.S. Economic And Political Clout
Many of China's gains may come at the expense of U.S. in-
terests. For example, Latin American companies opening
manufacturing facilities are becoming more dependent on Chi-
nese investment to lower their manufacturing costs. 15 7 Compli-
151. See generally Selmeski, supra note 38.
152. Id. at 7; see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
153. See Corchado, supra note 104; Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8; supra notes
50-118 and accompanying text.
154. See HAROLD C. HINTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE POLITICS, 94-95
(1973) (noting that Stalin used police forces to control his party and used a brutal
approach to pressure peasants).
155. See Stephen Schwartz, The New Evil Empire?, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 13,
2004, at 16 (noting that the citizens of Soviet communism were promised freedom
and wealth and instead received government oppression).
156. See supra notes 110-29 and accompanying text. This is evident by the way
China has dealt with Cuba. While the United States punishes Dictator Fidel Castro
for his human rights abuses, China freely trades with the island. Id.
157. See generally China/Brazil, supra note 96.
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eating matters, Latin American companies in China (and Chi-
nese companies in Latin America) may not adhere to the strict
environmental and labor standards that United States imposes
in exchange for economic aid and trade agreements. 158 More-
over, "even if average incomes remain low, a growing number of
Chinese will enjoy high incomes."159 If China continues to grow
at the current pace, "by 2020 [its] top 100 [million] households
will have an average income equivalent to the current average
in western Europe." 160
China's regional influence has already diminished U.S. lev-
erage with Latin American countries. For example, because of
frustrations over the results of NAFTA,161 Mexico is now focus-
ing on how it can increase trade with China. 62 Trade with the
United States will always be important for Mexico, but Mexico
now believes that its future lies in favorable trade agreements
with China. Countries that have been hurt by Chinese eco-
nomic competition have realized that they must adjust and find
mutually beneficial trade agreements with China. 63
4. Potential Loss of Support for U.S. Interests
The United States frequently bases trade agreements with
Latin American countries on cooperation with regard to human
rights, antinarcotics programs, environmental issues, anti-
terrorism initiatives, and U.S. national security concerns. 64 On
the other hand, China offers a less burdensome alternative to
dealing with the United States.' 65
Many Latin Americans do not share the same priorities as
158. See ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 12, at 3 ("The environmental re-
view process is designed to ensure that, through the consistent application of princi-
ples and procedures, environmental considerations are integrated into the develop-
ment of U.S. trade negotiating objectives and positions."); see also supra note 122
and accompanying text.
159. The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 9 (discussing the possibility
that a vast market for consumer goods will be opened up when China's real income
continues to grow by eight percent a year).
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 125-32.
162. See What has China Cost Mexico, supra note 74.
163. See id.; Mexico: Eyeing Oil Exports to China, supra note 88.
164. See Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3102 (2002); Chile FTA, su-
pra note 12 ("Cooperative projects will help protect wildlife, reduce environmental
hazards and promote internationally recognized labor rights.").
165. See O'Grady, supra note 1 (noting that China will complicate U.S. efforts in
environmental matters and other issues because China does not concern itself with
them); see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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the United States and believe that the United States does not
understand their concerns. 166 Some Latin American countries
struggle to find the resources to fight crime or even to feed their
people. They have problems with violent uprisings and internal
political strife. 167 Latin American countries may agree to coop-
erate with the United States when the United States offers at-
tractive economic incentives but if China offers equally attrac-
tive incentives with no burdensome and expensive
requirements, Latin American countries may prefer to deal with
China. 168
China, on the other hand, understands Latin American con-
cerns. It realizes that if too much focus is placed on the envi-
ronment or on human rights, a particular industry may never
get off the ground or fail to be competitive in the world mar-
ket. 169 In contrast to the United States, China has recently ex-
perienced these growing pains first hand and knows that deal-
ing with certain social issues may delay progress. However,
based on past actions, it is doubtful that China would require
any cooperation in these matters.
5. Potential Loss of Political and Logistical Support in the Event
of a U.S. Confrontation With China
China has made military moves and arms deals that should
raise warning signs in the United States. China has sold mis-
sile technology to Iran and delivered military equipment to
Cuba.170 It also appears that China has set up a permanent
electronic surveillance post in Cuba, just ninety miles from the
United States. 171 These actions may be considered political jock-
eying. For example, China's sale of military equipment to Cuba
may be in retaliation to the United States selling arms to Tai-
wan. 172 Its electronic surveillance outpost may be a political re-
sponse to the United States's monitoring of Chinese communica-
tions from its spy planes. A more realistic confrontation may
occur in the event of a forceful reunification with Taiwan.
China will continue using its economic power to accomplish
166. See generally Selmeski, supra note 38.
167. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 45-46, 100, 102, and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 132-39.
172. See supra note 120Error! Bookmark not defined, and accompanying
text.
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its own political goals. For several decades, the United States
has had treaty obligations to protect Taiwan from mainland ag-
gression. 173 China prefers a peaceful resolution but says it will
use force if necessary to bring back this "renegade province."174
If the United States decides to stand firm, it may need the back-
ing of Latin American countries in order to obtain international
legitimacy at the United Nations, where China is the only com-
munist country on the Security Council. It is also likely that
China will not be seen as an aggressor and regarded instead as
merely reeling in its own Taiwanese citizens who could be con-
sidered outlaws for pushing for secession. The United States, on
the other hand, may be seen as an aggressor meddling in the in-
ternal affairs of a sovereign nation, a sovereign nation whose
economic trade is imperative to continued economic growth in
Latin America.
While a lack of Latin American political support may hurt
the United States, the region's logistical cooperation with China
may prove fatal in the event of a military confrontation with the
United States. China may sabotage U.S. trade in Latin America
during a military confrontation and may even pressure Latin
American countries to stop trading in goods that "further" the
military efforts of the United States. China has controlled the
flow of goods between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean since
Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd., a Chinese company, was given con-
trol of both the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the Panama Canal
in 1997.175 Although the United States has the right to protect
the canal pursuant to the treaty it signed with Panama, Pana-
manian legislators may create laws eliminating such rights. It
is conceivable that Panamanian legislators may request that the
Chinese military move into U.S. built bases in order to "protect"
the canal; after all, the Chinese have filled the void left in Cuba
when the former Soviet Union pulled out.
173. See China, Taiwan Rebuff Powell Effort, at http://www.kazine.com/data-
bases/articles/october%2004%20(new)/china,%20taiwan%20rebutt%20powell%20effo
rt.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) (noting that U.S. treaty obligations involve provid-
ing defensive weapons to Taiwan and also that China has threatened to invade Tai-
wan in the event Taiwan officially declares statehood). Taiwanese President, Chen
Shui-bian, told visiting former South Korean President, Kim Young-sam, that 'Tai-
wan is definitely a sovereign, independent country... that absolutely does not be-
long to the People's Republic of China." Id.
174. See generally id..
175. See Rowan Scarborough, China Company Grabs Power Over Panama Ca-
nal, WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, 1999 WL 3091878 (noting that Hutchinson
Whampoa Ltd., a shipping company with ties to China's leadership and its armed
forces, controls both the Atlantic and the Pacific ports of the Panama Canal).
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As China's need for oil and as its obsession with reining in
Taiwan grows, China's control over the Panama Canal becomes
more important. The Chinese military recently published a
book entitled "Liberating Taiwan," detailing a plan to use Chi-
nese warships to impose oil embargoes on Taiwan, Japan, and
on the United States.176 In the event of such a confrontation the
loss of oil from Latin American countries may prove lethal to the
United States. It is with this sense of urgency that the United
States should counter China's growing influence by offering fa-
vorable bilateral trade agreements and reconsidering the wis-
dom of its agricultural subsidies.
B. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROCEED SLOWLY WITH THE
FTAA AND Focus ON BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
1. The United States Should Not Insist on the FTAA Until It
Helps Latin American Countries Establish Sound Social Policies
The FTAA may bring attractive long-term benefits poten-
tially offering lower prices for consumers and forcing countries
to strengthen their comparative advantages. 177 However, it may
be difficult if not impossible to reach those long-term benefits if
the short-term negative effects of free trade cannot be overcome.
For example, when foreign competitors are allowed to compete
with each other, many domestic industries are forced to lay off
workers and eliminate contracts with smaller providers of com-
ponents or raw material in order to increase their productiv-
ity. 178 If these and other negative effects are substantial, the
pressure to implement protectionist measures will increase. 179
The United States should not insist on the FTAA before
176. Bremner & Roberts, supra note 74, at 61.
177. See Nagging Debts About the Benefits of Globalization, and a Look at the
Evidence, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2004, at 80 ("[A]ll countries can raise their living
standards through specialisation and trade .... [Countries] gain] from focusing on
the goods in which [their] relative advantage is greatest .... "). The gains from the
winning sectors should more than compensate for the losses of the losing sectors. Id.
178. See Lindsay M. Fain6, Note, The Internationalization of Chilean Agricul-
ture: Implications of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 383, 404 (2004).
179. See generally Selmeski, supra note 38. The irony is that the protectionist
measures that keep competition out of the country actually keep the prices of domes-
tic goods artificially high. These high prices are financed primarily by poor consum-
ers, many of whom pushed for protectionist measures in the first place. See Fain6,
supra note 178, at 403.
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Latin American countries are ready to deal successfully with the
short-term negative effects of free trade. Latin American coun-
tries will have to establish sound social policies-such as job
placement and government retraining programs-before a free
trade agreement is implemented. People whose countries do not
have proper social policies in place will be disappointed in the
results of the FTAA and will lobby against it. President Bush
must also deal with the political pressures of domestic parties
such as labor unions and business groups. 180
It is in this political reality that the United States expects
Latin American countries to open its markets to U.S. goods
while accepting the generous farm subsidies the United States
bestows on its farming sector.181 U.S. agricultural subsidies are
a political sticking point in the FTAA negotiations, especially for
Brazil. U.S. politicians cannot afford to lose potential votes in
agricultural states such as Florida and President Bush has
made it clear that farm subsidies will be excluded from FTAA
negotiations.18 2 Without giving up farm subsidies as Latin
Americans demand, the United States will not be able to obtain
the concessions that it demands, such as intellectual property
and antidumping provisions, nor will President Bush be able to
obtain a satisfactory FTAA.183 Without "a genuine initial bal-
ance of reciprocal concessions the final products of the negotia-
tions ends up disproportionately benefiting the United
States."184  The United States should recognize that Latin
American leaders feel these pressures to a greater degree since
significant portions of Latin American populations are often af-
fected by pro-trade policies. Additionally, these affected popula-
tions often create more trouble for their leaders even during
non-election years (for example by blocking roads, violently
demonstrating, and clashing with police forces).185
180. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1045 ("Domestic political constraints will
significantly affect the outcome of the FTAA negotiations: 'The choices of U.S. trade
negotiators are greatly affected by the demands of... domestic constituencies, in-
cluding labor, environment, and business groups, all of which in turn impact the
more general perceptions of the American public."') (quoting Christopher M. Bruner,
Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of Regionalism: The Free Trade Area of the
Americas, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 64 (2002)).
181. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
182. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1050 (asserting that President Bush will
not make concessions on agricultural subsidies, which have strong domestic con-
stituencies in battleground states).
183. See id.
184. Id. at 1053.
185. See Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform--or Muddle Along?, supra note
20051
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In non-democratic countries trade liberalization may not be
quite so complex. When there is no realistic threat of internal
dissent, it is easy to accomplish aggressive trade goals that will
benefit the country in the long term. Chile, for example, is now
a democratic country and one of the most open countries in the
world with regard to trade. However, Chile achieved this open-
ness largely because of policies created under its dictatorial re-
gime. In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the gov-
ernment, named himself president, eliminated union power, and
began to liberalize trade.18 6 Despite some tariff increases dur-
ing the 1980s, Chile continued its trade liberalization during the
democratic transition in 1990.187 However, now that Chile is a
stable democracy, and as worker groups proliferate, there is
growing internal opposition to Chile's broad trade liberalization,
particularly from the rural peasant farmers whom the govern-
ment may not have taken into account in conducting its trade
negotiations.18 8
Like Chile during its dictatorial years, non-democratic
China has the political flexibility to offer generous trade agree-
ments to Latin American countries because they face no realistic
threat of internal dissent. China's authoritative regime is free
to implement trade policies that may be unfavorable to a seg-
ment of its population. While the United States may be politi-
cally constrained from offering concessions that some Latin
American countries desire-such as access to U.S. agricultural
markets-China may be in a better position to grant these con-
cessions.18 9
An aggressive push for the FTAA by the United States
could erase a decade of progress with regards to the lowering of
tariffs and would make it easier for leftist, anti-American, pro-
protectionist candidates to be elected to office throughout Latin
America. The United States has employed aggressive, if not co-
ercive, pressure in promoting the FTAA.190 Robert Zoellick, U.S.
49; supra note 120 and accompanying text.
186. See Fain6, supra note 178, at 387-90.
187. See id. at 389-90.
188. See id. at 389 (discussing how Chile did not properly implement important
social policies that would have helped poor farmers adjust to trade liberalization).
189. See Brazil Exports, supra note 82.
190. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1039-40 ("[Ihe United States has de-
ployed a coercive, rather than benevolent, diplomacy."). Countries that stood firm
with Brazil were issued economic threats. Id. For example, Caribbean nations were
"told to forget about a newly negotiated trade agreement." Id. Central American
countries were issued similar warnings. Eventually they ended their support for the
Brazilian position but still did not fully embrace the U.S. position. Id.
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Trade Representative, has said that "America will not wait for
the won't-do countries."191 An aggressive push for the FTAA
also adds to the perception that only the United States will
benefit from such an agreement. This belief is further fueled by
the United States's refusal to find a fair trade balance and the
way in which the United States has pressured Brazil by at-
tempting to isolate it.192 Even seemingly non-protectionist
measures employed by the United States are perceived as an at-
tempt to benefit the United States. Labor and environmental
standards, for example, are seen as excuses to remove any com-
petitive advantage that a smaller country may have over the
United States. 193 Studies support this notion and show that the
FTAA will provide greater benefits to the United States than to
Latin America. 194
The FTAA would provide judicial tools beneficial to U.S.
domestic production. For example, U.S. multinational corpora-
tions would be able to sue Latin American governments in spe-
cial trade courts if those governments allow their corporations to
cut corners by ignoring environmental laws. Additionally, when
the wages of U.S. laborers increase, U.S. firms may be able to
use this judicial tool to sue Latin American governments in or-
der to make sure that their wages also increase. 195 Another one-
sided benefit for the United States is the elimination of national
restrictions on government procurement. U.S. companies could
afford to bid for prized government contracts in military bases
and ports throughout Latin America. It is highly unlikely that
Latin American companies could compete for similar govern-
ment projects in the United States. 196 The FTAA, it is said,
would allow the United States to reassert its hegemony over
191. Id. at 1055 (citing Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-
do Countries, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at 23).
192. Id. at 1057. Brazil demanded a "genuine balance of reciprocal concessions"
but the United States decided to try to isolate Brazil by negotiating around it. Id.
The United States effectively attracts Latin American countries with limited access
to the U.S. market while maintaining its agricultural subsidies. Id. Argentina was
given a trade offer by the United States as part of this "divide and conquer" strategy
but Argentina declined and instead sided with Brazil. Id.
193. See Ball, supra note 32, at B13.
194. Carranza, supra note 27, at 1038 ("[Imt is highly doubtful that Latin Ameri-
can countries stand to gain much from entering into an arrangement which gives
their rich counterparts-the USA and Canada-a much greater preferential market
access than the later are able to offer in return .. ") (citing Arvind Panagariya, The
Free Trade Area of the Americas: Good for Latin America?, WORLD ECON. 485, 504-
05 (1996)) (alteration in original).
195. Id. at 1032.
196. See id.
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Latin America to compensate for the relative decline of U.S.
global economic position. 197
2. Agricultural Subsidies Within the Legal Framework of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture
The United States has insisted on leaving the topic of agri-
cultural subsidies off the table throughout the FTAA negotia-
tions, preferring to discuss it within the WTO legal framework
instead. 198 Although the goal of the WTO Agreement on Agri-
culture ("Agreement") is to liberalize agricultural trade,199 the
Agreement has enabled developed countries to maintain "trade-
distorting subsidies and import restrictions."20 0  The Agree-
ment's provisions favor agricultural producers in developed
countries. For example, one characteristic of the Agreement is
that it converts non-tariff barriers to tariffs, while prohibiting
further non-tariff barriers. 201 Unfortunately, "many developed
countries evaded the underlying objective.., by setting... tar-
iff equivalents for non-tariff barriers at ... excessively high
level[s]. '"202 In essence, developed countries created tariff
equivalents with higher levels of protection than those used
"under the old system of quotas and variable import levies."20 3
Another way that the Agreement benefits agricultural pro-
ducers in developed countries is by allowing them to determine
197. Id. at 1034 ("[The FTAA is part of the U.S. 'imperial project' to consolidate
'client regimes' in Latin America.") (citing James Petras, U.S. Offensive in Latin
America: Coups, Retreats, and Radicalization, available at http://www.monthly
review.org/0502petras.htm).
198. Id. at 1050.
199. See generally Gonzalez, supra note 43, at 452-53.
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture obligates WTO members to liberalize
agricultural trade in three significant respects. First, the Agreement ex-
pands market access by requiring the conversion of all non-tariff barriers to
tariffs (tariffication) and the binding and reduction of these tariffs. Second,
the Agreement requires the reduction of both the volume of and expendi-
tures on subsidized exports. Third, the Agreement requires the reduction of
trade-distorting domestic subsidies.
Id.
200. Id. at 460.
201. Id. at 453, 460 (noting that non-tariff import restrictions include "quotas,
embargoes, variable import levies, minimum import prices, and non-tariff measures
maintained by state enterprises").
202. Id. at 460 (discussing that this "dirty tariffication" nullified the benefits of
tariff bindings and tariff reduction by creating tariff equivalents).
203. Id. at 460-61.
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which tariffs to reduce.204 Naturally, developed countries re-
duced tariffs on items produced outside of their borders.205 De-
veloped countries were also able to utilize the Agreement's
unique safeguard provision, which allowed them to impose "ad-
ditional duties in the event of an import surge or of particularly
low prices compared with 1986-88 levels."206  The developed
countries would then set the trigger prices far above this aver-
age.207 This safeguard provision, though, is not available to
most developing countries. It is available only to those coun-
tries that have engaged in "tariffication" in the past (those that
converted all their non-tariff barriers to tariffs).208
While attempting to liberalize agricultural trade, "the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture did not prohibit the use of export
subsidies in the agricultural sector."209 Under the agreement,
developed countries are able to use export subsidies to their ad-
vantage over developing countries because developed countries
have "historically subsidized agricultural production, whereas
developing countries have historically needed to tax the agricul-
tural sector."210 In fact, "only 25 out of 135 countries have the
right.., to subsidize exports."211
With regards to domestic subsidies, the Agreement requires
countries to reduce them. 2 12 In the interest of reducing domestic
subsidies, "[t]he Agreement require[s] countries to reduce do-
mestic subsidies based on an Aggregate Measure of Support
(AMS),"213 but the Agreement also exempts many of the subsi-
204. Gonzalez, supra note 43, at 461.
205. Id. (commenting further that the Agreement required a thirty-six percent
reduction on average and noting that tariff reductions differed between temperate-
zone products and tropical products, the later being lower and the former higher).
206. Id. at 462-63.
207. Id. at 463 (discussing that developed countries are able to reduce market
access by applying additional duties whenever the world market price for a particu-
lar good reaches a certain percentage below the inflated trigger price).
208. Id. at 463.
209. Id. at 463-64 (noting that the agreement merely requires a reduction in
export subsidies). The Agreement actually establishes "permissible levels of market
distortion." Id. at 464.
210. Gonzalez, supra note 43, at 464 (discussing further that the Agreement ex-
acerbates inequalities between developed and developing countries).
211. Id. (noting further that the Agreement exacerbates inequalities between
developed and developing countries).
212. Id. at 465.
213. Id. at 466 ("[AMS is] a baseline figure that [takes] into account all domestic
agricultural subsidies during the 1986-88 base period."). In calculating the AMS,
several factors are considered: "amber box" subsidies are "those subsidies deemed to
be most trade-distorting"; "blue box" subsidies are "direct payments to farmers un-
der production limiting programs"; "green box" subsidies are those that have "mini-
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dies traditionally utilized by developed countries. 214
The U.S. Farm Act, which provides certain subsidies to the
American farming sector, introduces counter-cyclical pay-
ments.215 These payments are controversial because the United
States claims that counter-cyclical payments fall under the
"green box" exemption since the money is not linked to what the
farmers grow, nor to how much they grow. 216 Critics argue that
counter-cyclical payments should not be exempt because they
are indeed linked to production influencing the fair price that
farmers should be able to obtain. 217 Latin American countries
recognize that the WTO legal framework within which the
United States wants to negotiate clearly provides the United
States with an unfair competitive advantage. 218 If the United
States insists on installing the Agreement as the legal frame-
work for the FTAA, key players such as Brazil and Argentina
will not join the FTAA and ultimately the FTAA will not be
formed.
C. RECOMMENDED U.S. STRATEGY
For now, the United States should forgo the FTAA and in-
stead promote an individualized trade plan for each Latin
American country. 21 9 The United States should use industry-
specific and country-specific consultative committees just like it
mal or no trade-distorting effects" and are therefore exempted from subsidy reduc-
tion. Id.
214. Id. at 465 (discussing further that these exemptions lead to a marginal de-
crease in domestic subsidies).
215. See generally Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-171 § 1103(d), 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.) (allowing payment from 2002 through 2007 when the
effective price for the covered commodity is less than the target price for the covered
commodity).
216. See generally Sophia Murphy, Farm Bill Outrage Goes Global, FOREIGN
POL 'Y IN Focus, May 22, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.fpif.org/pdflgac/
0205farmbill.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (asserting that the farm bill's counter-
cyclical payments are not "decoupled" from production). Under the Uruguay Round,
"countries could give as much as they wanted to their producers if the payments
were 'decoupled'-meaning that such government payments should not be linked to
either what farmers grew or how much they grew." Id.
217. Id.
218. Gonzalez, supra note 43, at 464 ("By permitting past users of export subsi-
dies to maintain these subsidies, subject to certain reduction obligations, while pro-
hibiting the introduction of new subsidies, the Agreement institutionalized the un-
fair competitive advantage held by developed country producers.") (internal citations
omitted).
219. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1036.
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is presently doing under NAFTA.220 At this time, the FTAA
would be detrimental to small countries that do not have the
necessary social policies in place to ensure a successful adjust-
ment to free trade. 221 In the meantime, individual industries
can work with their governments and with U.S. trade represen-
tatives to implement sound social policies to ameliorate the im-
pact of free trade. Matters of human rights (decent working
conditions and wages), assistance with terrorism (particularly in
potential hotspots in the Iguazu region), and other U.S. inter-
ests (such as antinarcotics cooperation) can be tied into each in-
dividualized trade plan but the most important part of this plan
is the mutual cooperation between the United States and each
Latin American country in the interest of developing social poli-
cies that will alleviate the short-term pains due to free trade.
These social policies must specifically consider the very poor
sectors of society and populations with limited skill sets. The
fact that many Latin American countries do not have the re-
sources to retrain their citizens is problematic. By not taking
these citizens into account in developing their social policies,
Latin American countries run the risk of fueling dangerous up-
risings which further impede economic progress. Poor Latin
Americans must be taught new skills that will enable Latin
American countries to improve upon their comparative advan-
tage in the aggregate.
Social policies meant to ameliorate the short-term impact of
free trade are meaningless without reliable physical infrastruc-
tures like roads and potable water. Specifically, Latin American
countries lack dependable roads and basic services like trash
collection and telephone access. The United States must be an
active participant lest it be seen as the greedy instigator of
harmful big business trade agreements. 222 The United States
must be ready to partner with each Latin American country to
build the infrastructure necessary to support these social poli-
cies. Like China, the United States should pursue joint ven-
tures with local companies and governments in order to build
roads, upgrade sewer systems, and provide telephone service to
tens of thousands of people. Genuine partnerships will create
jobs, promote trade, and improve overall relations between the
United States and Latin American countries. 223
220. See Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
221. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1050-51.
222. See id. at 1054.
223. See id. at 1064.
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The United States also needs to address domestic political
problems before free trade agreements are made with Latin
America. Otherwise, groups of citizens may make it politically
impossible for U.S. legislators to approve free trade agreements.
The United States could take important domestic steps now in
order to prepare itself for a future FTAA. For example, it could
open its agricultural industry to a few countries at a time,
thereby giving U.S. farmers time to adjust and sending a mes-
sage to Brazil and other Latin American countries that it is sin-
cere about a fair FTAA in the future. 224 Another important rea-
son why the United States should consider opening its
agricultural industry, even if it is to one country at a time, is
that China is becoming an attractive alternative trade partner
to Latin American countries. China has to feed over one-and-a-
half billion people and it seeks to import agricultural products
from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and other Latin American coun-
tries in order to do so. 225 With such a willing consumer, Latin
America will have an attractive alternative to the United States
if the United States refuses to budge in its protection of its agri-
cultural industry.
The United States must take seriously the national priori-
ties of each Latin American country.226 The United States
should not pressure Latin American politicians but rather it
should treat Latin American leaders with cortesia, that is, it
should not ignore (not addressing their concerns and interests),
bully (aggressively pushing for the FTAA), or perplex (pushing
for the FTAA while maintaining U.S. agricultural subsidies)
Latin American leaders. 22 7 It should present a clearer vision for
Latin American policy. 228
CONCLUSION
Trade relations between China and Latin America are
growing. China is forming solid economic alliances and provid-
ing an attractive alternative to dealing with the United States.
The United States cannot afford to lose economic or political
clout to China or it may lose Latin American support for impor-
224. See id. at 1065.
225. See Brazil Exports, supra note 82; Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35;
Fruit to China, supra note 85.
226. See Selmeski, supra note 38, at 12.
227. Id. at 6.
228. Id. at 13.
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tant interests such as human rights, democracy, and a reliable
oil supply.
The United States must act to counter China's involvement
by opting for bilateral trade agreements with sound social poli-
cies rather than by aggressively pursuing the FTAA. The
United States should not hide behind the legal framework of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture because this increases Latin
American resentment and encourages these countries to seek
other trading partners like China. Instead, the United States
should understand and address the needs of each Latin Ameri-
can country and form partnerships in key sectors such as the oil
industry. It must also work with Latin American governments
to build the infrastructure necessary to support future, mutu-
ally-beneficial free-trade agreements. Due to the factors out-
lined in this Note, such as increasing anti-U.S. sentiment, the
growing popularity of leftist leaders, the emergence of China as
an economic alternative to dealing with the United States, and a
trend towards the nationalization of oil industries, the more ag-
gressively the United States pushes for the FTAA without tak-
ing into account social policies in Latin America, the more pre-
carious its future supply of regional oil becomes. More than
economic trade is at stake for the United States.
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